Macroeconomic calibrations imply much larger labor supply elasticities than microeconometric studies. The most well known explanation for this divergence is that indivisible labor generates extensive margin responses that are not captured in micro studies of hours choices. In this paper, we argue that macro models should be calibrated to match microeconometric estimates of extensive margin elasticities. We evaluate whether existing calibrations of macro models are consistent with micro evidence on extensive margin responses using two approaches. First, we use a standard calibrated macro model to simulate the impacts of tax policy changes on labor supply. Second, we present a meta-analysis of quasi-experimental estimates of extensive margin elasticities. We …nd that micro estimates are consistent with macro evidence on the steady-state (Hicksian) elasticities relevant for cross-country comparisons. However, micro estimates of extensive-margin elasticities are an order of magnitude smaller than the values needed to explain business cycle ‡uctuations in aggregate hours. Hence, indivisible labor does not explain the large gap between micro and macro estimates of intertemporal substitution (Frisch) elasticities.
Introduction
Macroeconomic models that seek to explain ‡uctuations in hours of work over the business cycle or across countries imply much larger labor supply elasticities than microeconometric evidence. Understanding this divergence between micro and macro elasticities is critical for questions ranging from the sources of business cycles to the impacts of tax policy on growth and inequality. Starting with the seminal work of Rogerson (1988) and Hansen (1985) , the most widely accepted explanation of the divergence is the extensive margin response created by indivisible labor supply. If labor supply is indivisible, changes in tax or wage rates can generate large changes in aggregate hours by inducing extensive margin (participation) responses even if they have little e¤ect on hours conditional on employment. In view of this argument, modern macro models are calibrated to match low micro estimates of intensive margin elasticities.
However, the extensive margin elasticity (equivalently, the density of the reservation wage distribution at the margin) is usually treated as a free parameter that can be calibrated purely to match macroeconomic moments.
We argue that the extensive margin elasticity should not be treated as a free parameter; rather, macro models should be calibrated to match micro estimates of extensive margin elasticities in the same way that they are calibrated to match micro estimates of intensive margin elasticities. The same marginal density that determines the impacts of macroeconomic variation on aggregate employment also determines the impacts of quasi-experiments such as tax policy changes on employment rates. 1 In this paper, we assess whether existing calibrations of macro models are consistent with the large body of micro evidence on extensive margin responses. In doing so, we …nd that it is crucial to distinguish between two types of "macro" elasticities: Hicksian elasticities, which govern steady state di¤erences, and Frisch elasticities, which govern intertemporal substitution at business cycle frequencies. We take two approaches to comparing macro calibrations with micro elasticity estimates, both of which indicate that micro and macro evidence agree about Hicksian (steady state) elasticities but disagree about Frisch (intertemporal substitution) elasticities.
First, we simulate the impacts of policy changes that generate exogenous changes in incen-tives to work in a standard macro model and compare the predicted responses with the …ndings of microeconometric studies. We use Rogerson and Wallenius '(2009) [RW] calibrated model of lifecycle labor supply, which generates an intertemporal substitution elasticity of aggregate hours above 2 even when calibrated to generate a Frisch intensive-margin elasticity below 0.5.
We simulate labor supply responses to three policies: (1) a tax-free year in Iceland in 1987 studied by , (2) a randomized experiment providing temporary subsidies for work to welfare recipients in Canada (Card and Hyslop 2005) , and (3) the 1987 expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) for low-income individuals in the United States (Eissa and Liebman 1996) . Each of these policy changes induces sharp variation in net-of-tax wage rates that permits identi…cation of extensive margin elasticities under relatively weak assumptions. The …rst two examples are ideally suited for identifying the intertemporal substitution (Frisch) elasticity because they induce temporary variation in wage rates. To explore whether the results of these three studies are representative of the broader literature, we conduct a meta-analysis of quasi-experimental estimates of extensive margin elasticities. We summarize results from …fteen studies that span a broad range of countries, demographic groups, time periods, and sources of variation. Despite the great variation in methodologies, there is consensus about extensive margin elasticities. The mean extensive margin elasticity among the studies we consider is 0.27 and every estimate is below 0.45. These small elasticities imply that most individuals are at a corner in their employment choices; that is, the density of individuals at the margin of employment is thin in practice. The intertemporal substitution elasticity estimates for temporary policy changes are similar to the steady-state elasticity estimates obtained from permanent policy changes. The elasticities are higher for subgroups that are less attached to the labor force, such as single mothers and individuals near retirement. The elasticities are much smaller for prime-age males and higher income individuals. This heterogeneity mirrors the heterogeneity observed in macro studies of steady-state responses. However, the heterogeneity across subgroups magni…es the discrepancy between micro and macro estimates of intertemporal substitution elasticities. Employment rates ‡uctuate substantially over the business cycle even for prime-age males, a sharp contrast with the near-zero micro extensive margin elasticity estimates for this subgroup. These …ndings indicate that labor supply responses to taxation could indeed explain much of the macroeconomic variation in hours of work across countries. 2 On the intertemporal substitution margin, the limited existing evidence on intensive margin elasticities suggests that values around 0.5 are consistent with both micro and macro data. However, micro and macro estimates of extensive margin intertemporal substitution elasticities di¤er by an order of magnitude. Quasi-experimental estimates of extensive margin intertemporal substitution elasticities are around 0.25, whereas leading macro models all imply intertemporal substitution extensive margin elasticities around 2. Hence, the key puzzle to be resolved is why employment rates ‡uctuate so much over the business cycle relative to what one would predict based on the impacts of tax changes on employment rates -that is, why micro and macro estimates of the Frisch extensive margin elasticity are so di¤erent. Even accounting for indivisible labor, micro studies do not support widely used representative-agent macro models that generate Frisch elasticities above 1.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section brie ‡y reviews the existing literature on indivisible labor and clari…es the terminology used to refer to various elasticity concepts. Section 3 reports simulations of the three quasi-experiments in the Rogerson and Wallenius (2009) model. Section 4 presents the meta-analysis of micro estimates. In Section 5, we compare micro and macro evidence on the intensive and extensive margins. Section 6 concludes.
Details of the simulation methods and meta-analysis are given in the appendix.
Indivisible Labor: Background and Terminology
Macroeconomic models require large labor supply elasticities to explain variation in hours of work over the business cycle and across countries with di¤erent tax regimes. 4 If individuals cannot freely choose hours of work or face …xed costs of entry, aggregate employment depends upon the distribution of reservation wages in the economy. If this distribution has substantial density at the margin -i.e., many individuals are indi¤erent between working and not working at prevailing wage rates -then a 3 For instance, in a recent survey of microeconometric evidence, Saez et al. (2009) write that "the profession has settled on a value for this elasticity close to zero." 4 The literature has taken two approaches to aggregation with indivisible labor supply: aggregation over states via employment lotteries (e.g. The micro evidence on extensive margin responses that we summarize here is relevant to calibrating either model, although the heterogeneity in responses across subgroups is more easily interpreted through a lifecycle model. 4 small reduction in wage rates could reduce aggregate hours of work signi…cantly because many individuals will stop working. Yet the same change in wage rates may not a¤ect hours of work conditional on employment very much, implying a small intensive margin labor supply elasticity. As a result, a model with large extensive margin elasticities and small intensive margin elasticities could match both the micro and macro evidence.
In parallel with the development of macro models of indivisible labor supply, a large microeconometric literature has recognized the importance of the extensive margin in the analysis of labor supply. Heckman (1984) presents an early discussion emphasizing the importance of extensive margin labor supply choices in the analysis of aggregate ‡uctuations. Heckman (1993), Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) and Browning, Hansen and Heckman (1999) survey the literature on labor supply models that explicitly model participation decisions.
Despite the development of this microeconometric literature, modern macro models typically treat the extensive margin elasticity as a free parameter that can be calibrated purely to match macroeconomic moments. King and Rebelo (1999) observe that real business cycle models can match aggregate data even if calibrated with small intensive-margin elasticities provided that the extensive margin responses are su¢ ciently large. Rogerson and Wallenius (2009) argue that "micro and macro elasticities are e¤ectively unrelated" because a small intensive margin response can always be o¤set by a larger extensive margin response. Hall (2009) calibrates his search model to match low micro intensive-margin elasticities but includes "a substantially elastic employment function...to rationalize the fact of elastic annual hours with the microeconomic …nding that the weekly hours of individual workers are not nearly so elastic." Ljungqvist and Sargent (2011) remark that "competing visions about the labor supply elasticity will be reconciled" by life cycle time-averaging models because retirement could be highly elastic even though hours of work are not.
One reason that macro models may not have been calibrated to match micro evidence on the extensive margin is that extensive margin elasticities vary with the wage rate unless the density of the reservation wage distribution happens to be uniform. Hence, any micro estimate of an extensive margin elasticity is necessarily local to the wage variation used for identi…cation.
However, this argument does not justify treating the extensive margin elasticity as a free parameter for two reasons. First, if the micro estimates are identi…ed using variation similar to that used in macroeconomic comparisons, one will obtain the appropriate local elasticity 5 relevant for macro calibrations. Second, the same problem arises when calibrating macro models with micro estimates of intensive margin elasticities, insofar as elasticities will only be constant on the intensive margin if utility happens to produce a constant-elasticity labor supply function. We revisit this issue in Section 5 and show that, if anything, heterogeneity in elasticities reinforces the conclusions drawn below.
Terminology. The macro literature uses the term "macro elasticity"to refer to the Frisch elasticity of aggregate hours and "micro elasticity" to refer to the intensive-margin elasticity Each of these four elasticities can be estimated using both micro data and macroeconomic variation. We use the terms "micro" and "macro" elasticities exclusively to refer to the source of variation used to estimate the elasticity. Setup. RW analyze an overlapping-generations model in which a unit mass of agents is born
, where is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS),
is the marginal propensity to earn out of unearned income, and A wl is the ratio of assets to earned labor income (Ziliak and Kniesner 1999, Browning 2005). 6 Subsequent studies calibrate models to match Prescott's Frisch elasticity of 3, but choose a di¤erent functional form for utility and wealth-earnings ratios (e.g. Trabandt and Uhlig 2009). The conclusions drawn by these studies -e.g. that reductions in tax rates would increase tax revenue -might di¤er had they directly matched the steady state elasticity of 0.7 implied by Prescott's data. log (c)
where is the tax rate and T is a lump-sum tax rebate that balances the government's budget.
The model can be solved analytically as described in RW and in the online technical appendix to this paper. 7 Because wages are paid per e¢ ciency unit, individuals have low hourly wage rates at the beginning and end of their lives and …nd it optimal not to work at those points.
This generates an extensive margin of participation over the life cycle. The convex disutility over hours of work generates an intensive margin hours response to changes in wage rates as well. RW normalize the price of output to 1 and assume a constant-returns-to-scale production technology, so changes in tax rates have no impact on pre-tax wages and prices.
RW calibrate the parameters , e 1 , and h to match empirically observed values for the fraction of life worked (f ), the maximum number of hours worked in a given period (h max ), and the wage rate at retirement relative to the maximum wage rate over the lifecycle (w R =w max ). 8 Following RW, we set h max = 45% of total time and w R =w max = 1=2. We set f to match the aggregate employment rate in the period prior to each policy experiment we consider. We choose parameters that generate an intensive margin Frisch elasticity of " INT = 0:5, consistent with the microeconometric evidence summarized below; we show in Appendix A that alternative values of " INT yield similar results.
For each of the three tax policy changes simulated below, we choose the model's four parameters f ; e 1 ; h; g to match the four moments fh max ; w R =w max ; f; " INT g under the tax system prior to the tax change. 9 In all three cases, the calibrated RW model generates an intertemporal substitution elasticity for aggregate hours between 2.35 and 2.65 despite having an intensive margin intertemporal substitution elasticity of only 0:5, consistent with RW's 7 The technical appendix is available at http://obs.rc.fas.harvard.edu/chetty/ext_margin_tech_appx.pdf 8 RW show that the intertemporal elasticity of aggregate hours in their model is not sensitive to the micro intensive-margin intertemporal elasticity, which is controlled by . They therefore calibrate , e1, and h to match the three moments conditional on various values of . 9 In one of the simulations, the welfare simulation in Canada, a small enough fraction of the population is employed prior to the intervention that …tting wR=wmax = 1=2 would require negative productivity at certain points in the life cycle. Consequently, for that simulation, we set e1 = 0, generating
To simulate the impacts of unanticipated tax changes, we must specify how the lump sum rebate T changes for each agent. To simplify aggregation, we assume that each generation receives a lump-sum rebate equal to the taxes they pay at each instant in time. 10 We ignore heterogeneity in the tax system across individuals and set equal to the average tax rate for the subgroup analyzed (which is relevant for extensive margin decisions). To evaluate whether the model's predictions are more accurate for these more elastic subgroups, we consider a policy experiment targeted at welfare recipients who frequently transition in and out of the labor force.
In the early 1990s, the Canadian government conducted the Self Su¢ ciency Project (SSP) to test whether a temporary earnings subsidy could induce welfare recipients to start working.
The project was a randomized experiment involving over 5,000 single parents who had been on welfare for at least one year. Half the individuals (the treatment group) were given a wage subsidy of approximately 50% if they worked more than 30 hours per week. The subsidy lasted for 36 months. 11 Under the prevailing welfare system in Canada, welfare payments were reduced dollar-for-dollar with earnings above a low baseline level. As a result, a single parent with one child in the control group faced an e¤ective average tax rate of 74.3% when moving from no work to full-time work (see Appendix A). In contrast, an individual in the treatment group faced an e¤ective average tax rate of 16.7% for the same change. We model the SSP experiment as a tax reform that lowers the tax rate from = 74:3% to = 16:7%
for a three year period, after which the tax rate reverts to = 74:3%. The employment rate during the month the experiment began was f = 23:5%. by approximately 14 percentage points in the treatment group relative to the control group a year after the subsidy was introduced. These employment gains fade away after the subsidy 1 1 Individuals were given up to one year to start working and the 36 month period began after they started to work. This feature of the program generated an incentive to establish eligibility for the subsidy by working within the …rst year, accentuating the intertemporal substitution incentive. We ignore this feature of the program in our simulation by assuming that the subsidy starts immediately after random assignment. This simpli…cation biases the size of the employment increase predicted by our simulation downward. expires, consistent with intertemporal substitution.
The series in red circles in Figure 1b shows the corresponding impacts predicted by the RW model. Because the sample analyzed by Card and Hyslop consists primarily of younger individuals (less than 2.5% of the sample is over age 50), we report simulated employment rates for individuals in the …rst half of the lifecycle (ages 16-46). The impacts predicted by the calibrated model -an employment increase of 52.8 percentage points one year after the subsidy is introduced -are again substantially larger than what is observed in the data. Hence, even for subgroups that are closer to the margin of entering or exiting the labor force and are therefore more elastic, the RW model signi…cantly over-predicts extensive margin responses. by Eissa and Liebman (1996) -is a permanent tax change whose impact is determined by the Hicksian rather than the Frisch elasticity. 12 The EITC expansion lowered average tax rates (including implicit taxes generated by the phase-out of transfers) from 58:9% in 1986 to 53:4% in 1989 for single mothers (Meyer and Rosenbaum 2000, Table 2 ). We model this tax change under the assumption that the tax system remains stable prior to 1985 and that the TRA86 change occurs immediately at the start of 1987, ignoring the phase-in of the reform.
The average employment rate for the single mothers aged 16-44 studied by Eissa and Liebman (1996) is f = 72:0% in the …ve years preceding the reform.
Eissa and Liebman calculate annual employment rates using CPS data. 
Meta-Analysis
In this section, we evaluate whether the three quasi-experiments considered above are representative of the broader literature by conducting a meta-analysis of extensive margin elasticity estimates. We focus on quasi-experimental studies that use changes in tax policies or longterm wage trends for identi…cation rather than structural studies that exploit variation in wage Moreover, structural models typically rely on strong exclusion restrictions for identi…cation. 13 The quasi-experimental studies we consider here exploit variation that is orthogonal to wage rates and thus are more robust to the biases emphasized by Keane and Rogerson. The exclusion restriction underlying these studies is that the di¤erential changes in tax rates across groups is not correlated with unobserved determinants of employment rates, typically a weaker assumption than those required for full identi…cation of a structural model. 14 Table 1 summarizes extensive margin elasticity estimates from …fteen quasi-experimental studies. The calculations underlying the estimates are described in Appendix B. We calculate the extensive margin labor supply elasticity as the change in log employment rates divided by the change in log net-of-tax wage rates. Employment rates are typically de…ned as working at any point during the year, though there are some di¤erences across studies as described in the appendix. We use the authors' preferred estimate whenever possible. For studies that do not report such an estimate, we construct elasticities from reported estimates of changes in participation and calculations of the change in net-of-average-tax wage rates.
The studies summarized in Table 1 report labor supply elasticities for various countries and subgroups using many di¤erent sources of variation. Yet the elasticity estimates exhibit substantial consensus. The elasticity estimates range from 0.12 to 0.43, with an overall unweighted mean across the …fteen studies of 0.27. To obtain further insight into the key patterns, we divide the studies into two groups -steady-state and intertemporal substitution -based on the type of variation they use for identi…cation.
The …rst panel in Table 1 shows steady-state elasticities identi…ed from permanent wage 1 3 Common instruments for wage rates include nonlinear age and time trends (Kimmel and Kniesner 1998) or interactions of education and experience (Gourio and Noual 2009) conditional on individual …xed e¤ects. Keane (2010) uses years of schooling as an instrument for the wage to identify an elasticity in Eckstein and Wolpin's (1989) classic structural model. The exclusion restrictions for these instruments are that employment rates do not vary with age conditional on wage rates or that individuals with di¤erent levels of education do not have di¤erent employment trajectories over their lifecycle. If factors that predict high wage rates also predict high latent tastes for work, the elasticity estimates would be biased upward. 1 4 Keane (2010) and Keane and Rogerson (2010) review structural estimates and …nd larger values than the quasi-experimental estimates summarized below. It would be useful to simulate the impacts of tax policy changes in these structural models to understand why their predictions di¤er from the reduced-form evidence.
13 changes resulting from tax reforms or long term trends in wage rates across regions or skillgroups. 15 The simplest empirical designs (e.g. Eissa and Liebman 1996) use di¤erence-indi¤erences approaches, while more recent studies (e.g. Meghir and Philips 2010) combine multiple reforms over time that a¤ect individuals di¤erently. The mean elasticity across the ten studies that estimate steady-state elasticities is 0.26.
The second panel in Table 1 summarizes results from studies that exploit temporary wage changes to identify intertemporal substitution (Frisch) Groups that have the weakest attachment to the labor force, such as single mothers or older workers near retirement, are the most elastic on the extensive margin (e.g. Meyer and Rosenbaum 2001, Gruber and Wise 1999). Among prime-age males, high rates of labor force participation and low aggregate hours elasticities (which combine the intensive and extensive margins) have led researchers to conclude that the extensive margin response is likely to be quite small (see e.g., Hausman 1985 and Juhn, Murphy, and Topel 1991). This is why most of the studies in Table 1 focus on groups with relatively low participation rates. Hence, the mean extensive margin elasticity in the population as a whole is likely to be below the unweighted mean across the studies in Table 1 of 0.27.
The heterogeneity in elasticities across subgroups implies that there is no single value of the extensive margin elasticity that can be used across applications. For instance, a recession or tax policy change that a¤ects prime-age males may generate smaller employment responses in the macroeconomy than a change in incentives that a¤ects other groups. The estimates in Table 1 should therefore be interpreted as a rough guide to plausible targets for calibration: they suggest that extensive margin elasticities around 0.25 are reasonable, while values above 1 are not.
Comparing Micro and Macro Estimates
The micro evidence points to Frisch and Hicksian extensive margin elasticities around 0.25.
Does this estimate generate aggregate hours elasticities consistent with macro estimates? The
answer to this question depends on the size of intensive margin elasticities because aggregate hours elasticities combine extensive and intensive elasticities. We therefore begin by summarizing the micro and macro evidence on both extensive and intensive margins in Table 2 . The sources and calculations underlying these estimates are described in Appendix C. The rows of Table 2 consider steady-state (Hicksian) vs. intertemporal substitution (Frisch) elasticities, while the columns compare intensive margin (hours conditional on employment) and extensive margin (participation) elasticities. Within each of the four cells, we report micro and macro estimates of the elasticity based on (unweighted) means of existing studies. We also calculate aggregate hours elasticities -the parameter relevant for calibrating representative agent models -by summing the extensive and intensive elasticities. 16 It is important to note that there are wide con…dence intervals associated with each of the point estimates in Table 2 , as well as ongoing methodological disputes about the validity of some of the underlying studies (see e.g., Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz 2009). Therefore, the estimates should be treated as rough values used to gauge orders of magnitude: di¤erences of 0.1 between elasticity estimates could well be due to noise or choice of speci…cation, while di¤erences of 1 likely re ‡ect fundamental discrepancies. We consider the evidence on steadystate and intertemporal elasticities in turn.
Steady-State. On the extensive margin, our rough estimate of the steady state elasticity from the micro literature is the mean of the estimates in Panel A of Table 1 Intertemporal Substitution. On the extensive margin, our preferred micro estimate of the 1 7 Our proposed elasticities of 0.5 on the intensive margin and 0.26 on the extensive margin may appear to contradict the common view that tax changes have smaller short-run e¤ects on the intensive margin than extensive margin. Chetty (2009) argues that the structural intensive margin elasticity relevant for longrun comparisons is larger than the structural extensive margin elasticity once one accounts for frictions. In particular, he shows that frictions attenuate observed extensive margin elasticities much less than intensive margin elasticities because the utility gains from reoptimizing are …rst-order on the extensive margin and second-order on the intensive margin.
intertemporal elasticity is the mean of the estimates in Panel B of Table 1 Table 1 ). The mean intertemporal aggregate hours elasticities implied by these four models is 2.61, as shown in Table 2 Table 2 were calibrated to match an intensive intertemporal elasticity of 0.5, they would require extensive intertemporal elasticities of 2.61-0.5 = 2.11 on average to match aggregate hours ‡uctuations. This value is an order of magnitude larger than all of the micro estimates shown in Table 1 .
Regardless of which macro model one uses, it is clear that the extensive elasticities implied by micro evidence are too small to match business cycle ‡uctuations in employment rates and aggregate hours. Macro models that justify high macro elasticities by appealing to indivisible labor implicitly assume that labor supply is far more elastic on the extensive margin than indicated by micro data.
Heterogeneity. As noted above, macro models may not perfectly match micro evidence on the extensive margin because extensive margin elasticities vary with the distribution of reservation wages at the margin. While one may be reluctant to calibrate a macro model to match an extensive margin elasticity estimate from any single study, the fact that every quasi-experimental study we reviewed …nds elasticities less than 0.45 casts doubt upon macro models calibrated with extensive margin elasticities above 1. Moreover, observable heterogeneity in elasticities reinforces the main conclusions drawn above. The heterogeneity in extensive margin responses across groups documented in Table 1 In contrast, heterogeneity ampli…es the discrepancy between micro and macro estimates of intertemporal substitution elasticities. Figures 2 and 3 show business cycle ‡uctuations in employment rates for men and women by age group. We also report coe¢ cients from regressions of the cyclical component of log employment rates on the cyclical component of log output ( ). Employment rate ‡uctuations over the business cycle decline monotonically with age and are larger for men than women. 18 Yet the estimates in Table 1 suggest that extensive margin elasticities are larger for older individuals than middle-age individuals and for women than men. Even prime-age (25-54) males -for whom micro estimates of extensive margin elasticities are close to zero -experience very sharp ‡uctuations in employment rates over the business cycles. In the population as a whole, a 1% increase in output is associated with an 0.50% increase in the employment rates at a business cycle frequency; for primeage males, the corresponding coe¢ cient is 0.46%. Hence, existing macro models require extensive intertemporal elasticities around 2 to explain business cycle ‡uctuations even for prime-age males. The sharp divergence between micro and macro estimates of extensive margin elasticities within subgroups further suggests that indivisible labor cannot fully account for the ‡uctuations in aggregate hours over the business cycle.
Conclusion
Indivisible labor is a central feature of modern macroeconomic models that seek to explain aggregate labor supply. From a qualitative perspective, microeconometric evidence clearly supports the importance of indivisible labor: every microeconometric study we reviewed found extensive margin responses to changes in wage rates. From a quantitative perspective, observed extensive margin responses are adequate to explain the gap between micro and macro estimates of steady-state elasticities when combined with factors such as frictions. However, extensive margin responses are not large enough to explain the gap between micro and macro estimates of intertemporal substitution elasticities. In the terminology of Ljungvist and Sargent (2011), the micro data reveal that most individuals are at a corner with respect to employment decisions.
Based on our reading of the micro evidence, we recommend calibrating macro models to match a Frisch extensive margin elasticity of 0.25 and a Frisch intensive margin elasticity of 0.5. 19 Hence, it would be reasonable to calibrate representative agent macro models to match 1 8 Aggregate hours ‡uctuate more for older workers than prime-age individuals (Gomme et al. 2005, Table  3 ), but employment rates do not (Shimer 2005, Figure 1 ). 1 9 That is, one should choose a reservation wage distribution such that a 10% increase in the net-of-tax wage leads to a 2.5% increase in employment rates. More generally, simulating quasi-experiments such as the tax policy changes analyzed here would be a simple way to evaluate which macro models are consistent with micro data. a Frisch elasticity of aggregate hours of 0.75. 20 These elasticities are consistent with the observed di¤erences in aggregate hours across countries with di¤erent tax systems. They also match the relatively small ‡uctuations in hours conditional on employment over the business cycle. The remaining challenge is to formulate models that …t the large ‡uctuations in employment rates over the business cycle when calibrated to match an extensive margin labor supply elasticity of 0.25. Even with indivisible labor, models that require a Frisch elasticity of aggregate hours above 1 are inconsistent with micro evidence. Calibration. The target values used to calibrate the model's parameters f ; e 1 ; h; g are described in the main text. The intensive margin Frisch elasticity of " INT = :500 corresponds to a compensated intensive margin elasticity of :333. In choosing the fraction of life worked (f ) for the calibration, we use the frequency at which employment is measured in the data.
For instance, in the EITC simulation we calculate labor force participation in a given year as whether an individual worked at all in the past year to match the annual employment observation CPS. Because of this, the fraction of life worked at any given instant (f ) di¤ers slightly from the stated target value. To calibrate f ; e 1 ; h; g, we …rst choose an e 1 and and calibrate the remaining parameters using the model's equilibrium conditions. We then adjust e 1 to match w R =w max and to match " INT = :500 manually, following RW. 
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Card and Hyslop observe employment rates at a monthly frequency for 53 months starting from the month of random assignment. To replicate this data as closely as possible, we de…ne labor force participation by whether a generation works in a given month. We calculate labor supply using 7,200 generations, so 10 generations are born or die each month. Generating w R =w max = 2 would require e 1 < 0. We therefore set e 1 = 0, generating w R =w max = :627.
With Eissa and Liebman observe employment rates at an annual level using CPS data. To replicate this data as closely as possible, we de…ne labor force participation by whether a generation works in a given month. We calculate labor supply using 6,000 generations, so 100 The compensated extensive margin elasticity is :565, while the Frisch extensive margin elasticity is 1:30. With these parameters, labor force participation jumps from 72:0% to 76:5% on impact and then rises to 77:0% over the next seven years. This jump is about 50% larger than what is observed in the data. The larger response relative to the simulations in the main text is due to the fact that the lower intensive margin compensated elasticity leads to a larger extensive margin compensated elasticity.
Calibrating to a smaller intensive Frisch elasticity of " INT = :25 thus does not change our conclusion the RW model is roughly consistent with quasi-experimental evidence for the EITC permanent tax change but over-predicts the impacts of the temporary changes in Iceland and
Canada by an order of magnitude.
retirement age elasticity into an elasticity of years of work with respect to the wage rate, we follow footnote 30 and multiply the elasticity by the ratio of the mean age at retirement to the mean years of service reported in Table 1 . The resulting elasticity is 0.08*(60.73/26.75).
Participation is de…ned as years of work, with variation on the retirement margin.
15. Manoli and Weber (2010): preferred estimate of elasticity of quarterly employment rate with respect to net wage (adjusting for taxes and pensions).
Appendix C. Micro vs. Macro Elasticities (Table 2) This appendix describes how each of the values in Table 2 using the log di¤erence in employment based on the slope coe¢ cient in Table 3 (bottom panel, Schneider tax data) and the sample means of labor force participation and tax rates in Table   1 for the corresponding sample. The elasticity from Nickell is computed using log di¤erences in employment based on the average point estimate of 2 percent (reported on page 10) and the sample means of employment rates and tax rates from Tables 1 and 2 , respectively.
Hicksian, intensive margin: The micro estimate is unweighted average of the uni…ed bounds in (2005) is computed using log di¤erences in annual hours per employed adult based on the slope coe¢ cient in Table 3 (middle panel, Schneider tax data) and the sample means of annual hours per employed person and tax rates in Table 1 for the corresponding sample. The value from Prescott (2004) comes from subtracting the Hicksian macro extensive margin elasticity (0.21) from the aggregate hours elasticity (0.70), which is estimated by regressing log actual hours on log net-of-tax rates (1 ) reported by Prescott in Table 2 .
Frisch, intensive margin elasticities: the micro estimate is the unweighted mean of 0.70 in Table 2 (2001), we define the employment rate as the fraction of weeks worked in a given year in the adult population. Panel (b): The Canadian SSP demonstration randomly assigned a group of welfare recipients a wage subsidy for 36 months in the early 1990s. Individuals in the control group faced an effective average tax rate of 74.3% for working full time at the minimum wage, while individuals in the treatment group faced an effective average tax rate of 16.7%. Following Card and Hyslop (2005), we report the difference in monthly employment rates between the treatment and control groups. We add the observed control group mean at the start of the experiment (23.6%) to the difference for scaling purposes. Simulated employment rates are the fraction of individuals age 16 to 46 working in a given month, reflecting the age distribution of the SSP treatment group (see Appendix A). Panel (c): The EITC expansion in the US in 1987 lowered average tax rates net of taxes and transfers for single mothers from 58.9% in 1986 to 53.4% in 1989. Eissa and Liebman (1996) report annual employment rates for single mothers aged 16 to 44; simulated employment rates are reported for the same age group. Notes: Solid red line in each panel shows log employment for men in different age groups in the United States, detrended using a Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter of 1600. Dashed line shows detrended log output (real GDP). Employment data is from the quarterly, seasonally adjusted series for employed men constructed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics using CPS data, available at www.bls.gov/data/#employment. Quarterly, seasonally adjusted data on real GDP is from the chained 2005 dollars GDP series constructed by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, available at http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp. The value of  reported in each panel is the coefficient from regressing the detrended log employment series on the detrended log real GDP series. Notes: Solid red line in each panel shows log employment for women in different age groups in the United States, detrended using a Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter of 1600. Dashed line shows detrended log output (real GDP). The value of  reported in each panel is the coefficient from regressing the detrended log employment series on the detrended log real GDP series. See notes to Figure 2 for details on construction of the plotted series. (2001), we define the employment rate as the fraction of weeks worked in a given year in the adult population. Panel (b): The Canadian SSP demonstration randomly assigned a group of welfare recipients a wage subsidy for 36 months in the early 1990s. Individuals in the control group faced an effective average tax rate of 74.3% for working full time at the minimum wage, while individuals in the treatment group faced an effective average tax rate of 16.7%. Following Card and Hyslop (2005), we report the difference in monthly employment rates between the treatment and control groups. We add the observed control group mean at the start of the experiment (23.6%) to the difference for scaling purposes. Simulated employment rates are the fraction of individuals age 16 to 46 working in a given month, reflecting the age distribution of the SSP treatment group (see Appendix A). Panel (c): The EITC expansion in the US in 1987 lowered average tax rates net of taxes and transfers for single mothers from 58.9% in 1986 to 53.4% in 1989. Eissa and Liebman (1996) report annual employment rates for single mothers aged 16 to 44; simulated employment rates are reported for the same age group.
APPENDIX FIGURE 1 Impacts of Tax Changes on Employment

